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FOREWORD TO THE SYMPOSIUM
BABY DOE AT TWENTY-FIVE
Charity Scott*
The so-called Baby Doe Rules, which are federal laws defining
"medical neglect" of newborns for states receiving federal funds for
child abuse programs, remain controversial twenty five years after
they were enacted. To explore their contemporary significance,
Georgia State University's College of Law, in partnership with
Emory University's Center for Ethics, hosted a law review
symposium on February 9, 2009, that was entitled "The 25th
Anniversary of the Baby Doe Rules: Perspectives from the Fields of
Law, Health Care, Ethics, and Disability Policy."1 Nationally
prominent professionals with expertise in neonatal medicine and
decision-making in these diverse, interdisciplinary fields spent the
day engaged in challenging debate and thoughtful reflection on these
federal rules.
And yet the Rules have seemingly become dormant for many
clinical practitioners who are actually caring for newborns in
neonatal intensive care units across the country. Although physicians
continue to struggle to help parents make good decisions for their
seriously ill infants, just as they did when the Rules were first
enacted, the Rules themselves apparently are not necessarily the
primary tools that guide medical and parental decision-making about
treatment in actual clinical practice today. Indeed, according to one of
the speakers at the symposium, many of the younger, more recently
trained neonatal physicians may not even have heard of the Baby Doe
Rules.
* Professor, College of Law and J. Mack College of Business Administration, Institute of Health
Administration, and Director, Center for Law, Health & Society, Georgia State University. A.B.,
Stanford University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
1. The symposium was supported in part by the generosity of The Greenwall Foundation and the
Health Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia. The Georgia State University Law Review co-
sponsored the symposium with the Center for Law, Health & Society at the College of Law.
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This volume of the Georgia State University Law Review collects
the essays of the symposium speakers. Several themes emerge from
their engaging presentations and insightful scholarship. First, the
normative standards for decision making remain as controversial
today as they were when the Baby Doe Rules were enacted. Several
authors note the Rules' origin in a right-to-life perspective of the
Reagan administration, and that perspective continues to have
advocates and critics today.
Second, advances in medical technology have made it possible to
save the lives of infants who, twenty five years ago, could not have
been saved. These advances mean that the kinds of cases posing
difficult ethical challenges today tend to involve extremely premature
infants whose prognosis both for survival and for future impairments
is highly uncertain. This prognostic uncertainty complicates treatment
decisions from both medical and policy perspectives. For example,
how does one incorporate disability rights concerns, which prompted
federal intervention in the first place in the 1980s and which were the
focus of the first set of Baby Doe Rules, when the nature and extent
of an infant's potential future disabilities are unknown? Third, the
intellectual and practical debates today incorporate disagreements not
only over what norms should be applied, but also over what processes
should be used for resolving conflicts over treatment options for
seriously ill or extremely premature infants.
The symposium offered the opportunity for speakers across a range
of perspectives to reflect on the meaning and application of the Baby
Doe Rules over past the 25 years. This Foreword provides a roadmap
to the speakers' essays and an introduction to the complex issues in
medicine, bioethics, law, and disability policy that the Baby Doe
Rules continue to raise.
INTRODUCTION TO THE BABY DOE RULES
A highly publicized case involving the withholding of medical
treatment from a baby with Down syndrome ("Baby Doe") in 1982 in
Bloomington, Indiana, gave rise in 1984 to the federal law known as
[Vol 25:4
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BABY DOE AT TWENTY-FIVE
the Baby Doe Rules, which went into effect the following year.2 In
the Indiana case, "Baby Doe" had a genetic anomaly known as
Trisomy 21, which usually entails some degree of mental disability.
He had an immediately life-threatening condition (a tracheo-
esphageal fistula) that prevented his being able to be fed normally.
With the concurrence of their obstetrician, the parents refused to
authorize surgery to save Baby Doe's life. Without the surgery, the
baby died.
During the public controversy that followed, the Department of
Health and Human Services promulgated regulations (the first set of
so-called Baby Doe Rules) under the authority of Section 504 of the
federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 3 Interpreting the Act as
prohibiting the denial of medical treatment to handicapped infants
solely on the basis of their handicap by federally funded institutions,
these administrative regulations encouraged hospitals to establish
Infant Care Review Committees and required them to post
"informational notices" delineating federal anti-discrimination laws
as applied to handicapped newborns. 4 The American Medical
Association and other hospital and medical associations challenged
these regulations, and ultimately the Supreme Court held them to be
invalid. 5
In the meantime, Congress promulgated another set of Baby Doe
Rules, which were adopted as amendments to the federal Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 6 and represented a
negotiated compromise between the proponents and opponents of the
first, antidiscrimination-focused regulations. This second set of Baby
Doe Rules, also known as the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984,7
remains the law today, and was the subject of the symposium. These
2. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)). For a
reproduction of these Rules, see Appendix A.
3. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
4. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55; 49 F.R. 1622 (1984) (discussion of Final Rules).
5. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
6. Pub.L. 93-247, Jan. 31, 1974, 88 Stat. 4.
7. Pub.L. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i (2006) and
implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)).
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rules condition the grant of federal funds for any state's child
protective services program on the state's assurance that it can
respond to reports of medical neglect, which may include the
withholding of medical treatment from disabled infants with life-
threatening conditions.
What do the Baby Doe Rules actually say?8 States receiving
federal funds for their child welfare programs must have procedures
for responding to reports of potential "medical neglect" of infants. As
such, this federal mandate fits within a state's already-existing legal
framework for responding to any potential case of child abuse or
neglect, including medical neglect.
The Baby Doe Rules define "medical neglect" as including the
"withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants
with life-threatening conditions." 9 "Medically indicated treatment"
includes treatment that in a physician's reasonable medical judgment
would most likely be effective in "ameliorating or correcting" all of
the infant's life-threatening conditions.
There are three exceptions when treatment is not medically
indicated under the Rules. 10 The first is when the infant is
"chronically and irreversibly comatose." The second exception
includes treatment that would "merely prolong dying"; would not be
"effective" as previously defined; or would be "otherwise futile in
terms of the survival of the infant." The third exception is when the
provision of treatment "would be virtually futile in terms of the
survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such
circumstances would be inhumane." The failure to provide treatment
to a seriously ill infant in any one of these three circumstances would
not fall within the definition of "medical neglect" under the Baby
Doe Rules.
What do the Baby Doe Rules really mean? Exploring this question
is what much of the symposium was all about. The non-binding
Interpretive Guidelines of the Department of Health and Human
8. See Appendix A to this Foreword.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B) (2006).
10. Id. § g(6).
[Vol. 25:4
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Services that accompanied the Rules state that they do "not sanction
decisions based on subjective opinions about the future 'quality-of-
life' of a retarded or disabled person."" The disagreement between
right to life advocates and advocates who urged taking quality-of-life
concerns into consideration in treatment decisions for very ill infants
was heated at the time the Rules were enacted, 12 and judging from the
essays published for this symposium, remains equally controversial
today.
Although Craig A. Conway was not a speaker at the symposium,
his essay is included in this volume to provide readers unfamiliar
with this field of law and ethics with an overview of the history of the
Rules, the ethical and philosophical tensions in decision-making for
extremely premature newborns (including the approaches based on
"vitalism" and sanctity of life perspectives, and those based on "best
interests" standards and quality-of-life concerns), and background to
some of the case studies referred to by the authors collected in this
volume, including the cases of Sidney Miller and Sun Hudson. 13 In
addition, a case scenario based on a draft by speaker Sadath A.
Sayeed formed a backdrop to some of the discussions at the
symposium, and is reproduced in Appendix B to this Foreword.
THE EVOLUTION OF NEONATAL MEDICINE IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE BABY DOE RULES
Mark R. Mercurio, Associate Professor of Pediatrics at Yale
University School of Medicine and Director of the Yale Pediatric
Ethics Program, opened the symposium with a thorough review of
the evolution of ethical perspectives, technological advances, and
11. 45 C.F.R. Pt. 1340 Appendix. These Guidelines also provide that even if an exception applies,
"the infant must nonetheless be provided with appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medication."
12. Compare James Bopp, Jr., and Thomas J. Balch, "The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and
Their Implementing Regulations: A Summary," 1 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 114-19 (1985) with Nancy K.
Rhoden, "Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality of Life Counts," 58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1283, 1313-33 (1985).
13. Craig A. Conway, "Baby Doe and Beyond: Examining the Practical and Philosophical Influences
Impacting Medical Decision Making on Behalf of Marginally-Viable Newborns," 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1097 (2009).
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clinical practice in newborn intensive care since the Rules were
promulgated. 14 His insightful essay reflects the French saying, "plus
9a change, plus c'dst la m~me chose."' 15 While there have been
significant changes in both the technology of neonatal treatments and
the attitudes of neonatologists and parents over the years, the
fundamental questions surrounding the care of seriously ill infants
remain the same.
What has changed? According to Mercurio, there are now more
premature and other seriously ill babies to care for, more specialty-
trained neonatologists and neonatal intensive care units (NICUs) to
care for them, and more options for their treatment. Technological
advances in prenatal diagnosis mean fewer surprises at delivery, in
part due to more pregnancy terminations after a prenatal diagnosis of
severe fetal anomalies. Advances in assisted reproductive technology
mean more multiple-gestation newborns, with corresponding
complications for their care. Technology today can be offered to
extremely premature infants who years ago would have been thought
too young to survive. Surgery and other treatments that were not
offered years ago for certain conditions (such as hypoplastic left heart
syndrome and Trisomy 13) are now offered and in some cases
encouraged or even considered obligatory. Most recently in 2008, a
neonatal calculator can now gauge with much improved accuracy the
statistical chances of survival with and without physical or
neurological impairments for extremely premature infants, based on
data collected on thousands of neonates at numerous NICUs across
the country. 16
What has not changed is the central question over treatment: How
low must the odds of survival be, or how severe must the burdens of
treatment be, to justify allowing parents to refuse medical treatment
14. Mark R. Mercurio, The Aftermath of Baby Doe and the Evolution of Newborn Intensive Care, 25
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 835 (2009).
15. "The more things change, the more they stay the same."
16. See National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, NICHD Neonatal Research
Network (NRN): Extremely Preterm Birth Outcome Data, available at http://www.nichd.nih.gov/
about/org/edbpm/pp/progepbo/epbocase.fm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
[Vol. 25:4
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for their infant?17 The line between viable and non-viable births may
have been pushed back over the years to fewer weeks of gestation
and lower birthweights, but that simply changes the point along the
continuum at which the central question gets raised: Should treatment
be optional, required, or not offered for parents whose infant is born
at twenty-one or twenty-two or twenty-three weeks' gestation? At
400 or 450 or 500 grams? What has also not changed is whether
considerations beyond those affecting only the infant should be taken
into account when deciding whether non-treatment is an option, such
as burdens on the infants' parents or siblings, or cost considerations
in long-term care.
Mercurio acknowledges that the attitudes of physicians and parents
have changed over the years. At his NICU today, for example,
parents of a Down syndrome baby with a condition similar to the
original Baby Doe would not be permitted to refuse the same life-
saving surgical repair; a court order to overturn that parental decision
would be sought and almost certainly obtained today.' 8 He also
observes that more common today than parental refusals of treatment
of arguably appropriate care are parental demands for arguably
inappropriate care. Rather than eliminate the hard cases, however,
such changes have simply shifted which cases are appropriate for the
hard moral work-to determine when the degree of burden to the
infant, including the severity of prognosis and anticipated disability,
justify non-treatment.19
THE BABY DOE RULES AND THE
ACTUAL PRACTICE OF NEONATAL MEDICINE
Several authors suggest that the Baby Doe Rules, despite the
controversy generated by them in the ethical, medical, and legal
literature over the years, have not had a major impact on the actual
practice of neonatal medicine. Sadath A. Sayeed, a faculty member at
17. Mercurio, supra note 14, at 844.
18. Id. at 848, 855.
19. Id. at 855.
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Harvard Medical School and a member of the Ethics Committee at
Children's Hospital Boston, acknowledges that it is unclear what
practical effect the Rules have had on actual clinical decision-
making, and suggests that they have not substantially changed long-
standing normative practices. 20 In his essay, Sayeed examines closely
the moral intuitions that underlie the Rules and the report of the
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research which preceded
them.2 1 He argues that the President's Commission supports an
ethical conclusion that exceedingly few newborns who have a chance
at survival should be denied a trial of medical treatment. Sayeed goes
on to assert that this controversial conclusion challenges a widely
accepted professional norm of recommending against treatment for
newborns of doubtful viability.
22
Sayeed begins with a thorough examination of the President's
Commission's ethical framework, with its emphasis on the Best
Interests Standard for decision-making. The Commission emphasized
that determining the best interests of the infant requires a very
restrictive balancing of the benefits and burdens of treatment, such
that treatment is denied only where continued survival would not be
of "net benefit" to the infant. Only the infant's own perspective is
relevant in this balancing, according to the Commission, not the
perspectives of the parents or others. Very few cases should be truly
ambiguous in the Commission's view; in most cases it should be
clear that treatment is either beneficial (and thus obligatory) or futile
(and thus not required).23
Sayeed then applies the Commission's ethical framework to actual
clinical practice involving cases of doubtful viability, where long-
term survival odds are low and the likelihood of significant
impairments in infants who do survive is high. He provides in-depth
20. Sadath A. Sayeed, "A Meditation on Newborns Who Need Medical Treatment to Survive," 25
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 865, 874, 893 (2009).
21. Id. at 866.
22. Id..
23. Id. at 867.
[VoL 25:4
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analysis of recent empirical literature which suggests that, in
professional practice, providers may be making treatment decisions
on the basis of categorical rather than individualized assessments of
the potential for survival (for instance, not to offer treatment below
twenty-three weeks' gestation). Not only did the Commission
recommend against such across-the-board thresholds, but their use
can become a self-fulfilling prophecy of the predicted low chances of
survival.24 Moreover, the data provide wide statistical variations in
survival which belie any categorical presumption that treatment is
"futile" in certain cases.
According to Sayeed, actual provider decision-making regarding
treatment is thus likely informed not just by survival chances, but by
predicted quality-of-life concerns as well.25 He poses the question
whether professional decision-making involving infants whose
viability is doubtful should focus more transparently on taking
advantage of small but real chances of survival, and less implicitly on
uncertain predictions of quality-of-life after survival. This approach,
he argues, would be consistent with the ethical underpinnings of the
President's Commission and the Baby Doe Rules. 26 He concludes his
thoughtful and thought-provoking essay with another call for
transparency in clinical decision-making. Although rejected by the
Commission as permissible factors in decision-making for seriously
ill newborns, concerns about the burden on parents and siblings and
the economic costs of aggressively treating infants of doubtful
viability in order to achieve their survival should be openly
acknowledged. These concerns may not ultimately trump newborn
survival interests, according to Sayeed, but they should be part of the
ethical analysis and societal debate.
Jatinder Bhatia, Professor and Chief of the Neonatology Section of
the Pediatrics Department of the Medical College of Georgia, also
suggests in his essay that the Baby Doe Rules do not have a
24. Id. at 876.
25. Id. at 882.
26. Id. at 891.
20091
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 809 2008-2009
)    809 
l i   t   
  
 t  i    
t  t ti l f r r i l  i t ,    
t t -t r  ' t ti .  
rec e  i st  r -t - r  t l ,  
   l l illi    f 
s r i l. 24 r r, t  t     
r i l i  li      
l "  
i  t  ,    
t t t       
re icte  alit - f-life r   ll.2   t   
t r r f i l i i i   
ia ilit  is tf l s l  f   t tl    
a a ta e f s ll t r l   i l,     
certai  re icti s f lit - f-lif  t  i l.  , 
he ar es, l  e sist t it  t  t i l i i   
r si t's i i   t       
t tf l  t t i    
tr s r c  i  li i l i i i .    
i i   i i l   i g sly 
ill e r s, r s t t  r   t    
t e ec ic c sts f r ssi l  tr ti  i t    
ia ilit  i  r r t  i  t ir i l  l  
l .     
i l i t t ,    
t i l l i   t l . 
ti r ti , r     t l  ti  f 
t e e iatrics rt t f t  i l ll   ,  
ts i  i   t t     
. [ . t . 
. [ . t . 
. [d. t . 
9
Scott: Baby Doe at Twenty Five
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
significant impact on clinical practice today.27 In his presentation at
the symposium, he observed from his personal experience that
neonatal practitioners in the current generation may not even be
aware of the Rules.
Bhatia focuses on the importance of palliative care for a newborn
for whom aggressive treatment will not, or will no longer, be
provided. He suggests that there are three primary circumstances in
which palliative care should be considered: (1) when a neonate is at
the limit of viability; (2) when a neonate has a lethal congenital
anomaly (such as anencephaly or Trisomy 13); and (3) when a
neonate has a serious condition that has not responded to maximum
medical or surgical treatment.28
Bhatia emphasizes the central role of parents in the decision to
initiate palliative care, which focuses on relief from pain for the
infant, warmth and comfort, privacy, and dignity after a decision to
withhold or discontinue aggressive therapy. Although he recognizes
that quality-of-life considerations are controversial under the Baby
Doe Rules, he suggests that they need to be considered in counseling
parents, who themselves need to be supported during the infant's
therapy and their decision-making process. He makes a critical
distinction between withdrawing therapy and not withholding care.
Even though a decision has been made to not offer, or to discontinue,
intensive therapy, the family should not experience that decision as
the termination or withholding of care. Hospice care should be
explored with the family, and palliative care-which embraces
physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of caring for the
infant-should always be offered to enhance the quality of the
infant's remaining life.29
If it is true as a matter of clinical reality, as Sayeed and Bhatia
suggest, that contemporary practitioners work in clinical settings
largely unaffected by a strict interpretation or application of the Baby
27. Jatinder Bhatia, "Baby Doe: Does It Really Apply Now? Palliative Care of the III Neonate," 25
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 901, 908 (2009).
28. Id. at 904.
29. Id. at 904, 905.
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Doe Rules, then other options are available to align the law more
closely with contemporary neonatal practice: society could encourage
stricter adherence to the Rules (a course favored by author Thomas J.
Balch, discussed infra under Process), or society could reject them in
favor of another standard of care more in line with actual practice (a
course favored by author Loretta M. Kopelman, in the next section).
CRITERIA: BY WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD DECISIONS INVOLVING
SERIOUSLY ILL INFANTS BE MADE?
Loretta M. Kopelman, Professor of Medical Humanities and
founding Chair of the Department of Medical Humanities at the
Brody School of Medicine at East Carolina University, argues that
the Baby Doe Rules should simply be rejected and that the Best
Interests Standard should govern treatment decisions for newborns,
just as that standard governs all other decisions affecting children. 30
Kopelman acknowledges that some professional groups, like the
American Academy of Pediatrics, have taken the position that the
Baby Doe Rules do reflect the Best Interests Standard and do not
inhibit reasonable medical judgment or substitute an alternative
standard of care for infants under one year of age; for these
professional groups, the Baby Doe Rules exist compatibly with
current medical practice and standards of care.31 She disagrees,
arguing that this interpretation is unsupported by the literal text of the
Rules which she finds inflexible, requiring maximal life-saving
treatment unless an infant is dying or comatose and allowing decision
makers no discretion to switch to a palliative course of treatment to
relieve a very sick infant's pain and suffering. She argues that the
Baby Doe Rules, by their terms, allow pain and suffering to be
considered in choosing a course of care only if treatment is virtually
futile in terms of survival-in other words, only if the infant will die
despite the treatment.
30. Loretta M. Kopelman, "Why the CAPTA's Baby Doe Rules Should Be Rejected in Favor of the
Best Interests Standard," 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 909 (2009).
31. Id. at 912,913.
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Her primary criticism of the Baby Doe Rules centers on what she
views as its deviation from the legal and ethical standard for
surrogate decision-making involving all other incompetent patients,
whether children or adults-namely, the Best Interests Standard.
According to Kopelman, the Best Interests Standard permits flexible,
individualized decision-making weighing the benefits against the
burdens of treatment, and it allows a surrogate to choose comfort care
rather than life-prolonging treatment for a patient who is
experiencing pain and suffering.32 She observes that the President's
Council on Bioethics takes this kind of individualized best interests
approach for incapacitated adult patients without an advance
directive. By way of example, she notes that the Council would
consider renal dialysis an optional treatment for an Alzheimer's
patient who became agitated and confused by being subjected to it
three times a week, even though the patient would quickly die
without it. She argues that the same principle should be applied to a
seriously ill infant in intractable pain (but not dying) for whom the
burdens of continued treatment outweigh its benefits. 33 Kopelman
maintains that the Baby Doe Rules would not permit this approach,
and that they wrongly single out for infants under one year of age a
set of rules that most adults would not tolerate for themselves. 34 She
advances the Best Interests Standard as a fairer and more
compassionate approach.
William J. Winslade, Professor of Philosophy of Medicine,
Preventive Medicine and Community Health, and Psychiatry and
Behavioral Sciences at the University of Texas Medical Branch,
Galveston, explores the principle of vitalism in ethical decision-
making for extremely premature infants. 35 He argues that, while it is
not ethically obligatory, vitalism is ethically relevant and is a
permissible ethical value for parents and health professionals to hold
32. Id. at916.
33. Id.
34. Id. 923,917.
35. William J. Winslade, Personal Reflections on Extremely Premature Newborns: Vitalism,
Treatment Decisions, and Ethical Permissibility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 931 (2009).
[VoL 25:4
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in making treatment decisions for such infants. He also advocates that
treatment decisions should be individualized and contextualized, and
that balancing ethical values rather than applying legal rules provides
a better basis for sound decision-making. He illustrates these
propositions with three case studies in which he was personally
involved yet tried to remain as objective as possible in the respective
circumstances.
Winslade was a paid consultant during the litigation of the highly
publicized Sidney Miller case in Texas. 36 Sidney's mother had come
to the hospital in premature labor, and after consulting physicians
about prospects for the infant, she and her husband asked that "no
heroic measures" be provided at birth and to "let nature take its
course." 37 Despite their request, the twenty-three week, 615-gram
infant was resuscitated in the delivery room, and after extensive and
on-going medical interventions she is still alive today, with
significant physical and mental impairments. Winslade concludes that
the parents' decision not to resuscitate at birth was both reasonable
and responsible. On the other hand, he also believes that had they
instead chosen aggressive treatment at birth based on vitalism, that
decision also would have been ethically permissible, just as it would
have been permissible after resuscitation to switch from aggressive to
comfort care in light of the girl's subsequent catastrophic medical
conditions.
38
In the second case, Winslade served as an ethics consultant to
parents of an extremely premature infant born at twenty-five weeks
and weighing less than 1,000 grams. The parents were reluctant to
question the physicians, and according to Winslade, "they had been
kept in the dark by peremptory reassurances that everything was
stable.",39 A colleague asked if Winslade would help the parents
navigate information-gathering and decision-making. Winslade
36. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758 (2003). Professor Winslade ultimately did not testify at
trial, and was not involved in the post-trial appeals.
37. Id. at 938.
38. Id. at 939.
39. Id. at 951.
2009]
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sought a second opinion from a neonatologist whom he considered to
be a "conservative, vitalist leaning physician" and who thought the
infant's prognosis was very poor or perhaps terminal.40 Emphasizing
the importance of fully and realistically informing parents about their
infant's prognosis, he argues that a vitalist decision by the parents to
continue aggressive life support would have been ethically
permissible, although their ultimate decision to choose pediatric
hospice care was also ethical under the circumstances.
In the third case, Winslade was engaged by a company that
provides utilization review for a large medical insurance group. He
considers whether it was ethical for physicians to honor parents'
demands for complex aggressive life support for a twenty-six week,
760-gram infant who continuously remained on ventilator support for
eight months until his parents agreed to limiting care a few days
before he died. Winslade thought the treatment was "excessive," and
the benefits administration company questioned whether the costs of
treatment ($2.8 million) were justified. Employing the well-known
four-quadrant model for ethical decision-making, 41 Winslade again
expresses concern about the adequacy of information provided to the
parents. He nevertheless concludes that had they been fully and
realistically informed about their child's prognosis, it would have
been ethically permissible, under a vitalist approach, for them to
request full aggressive care, even if others would disagree with that
decision.
PROCESS: How SHOULD DECISIONS INVOLVING
SERIOUSLY ILL INFANTS BE MADE?
Acknowledging that the Baby Doe Rules have not been widely
enforced as a practical matter, Thomas J. Balch, who is an attorney
and the Director of the Robert Powell Center for Medical Ethics,
40. Id. at 950.
41. ALBERT R. JONSEN, MARK SIEGLER, & WILLIAM J. WINSLADE, CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (McGraw-Hill 6th ed., 2006).
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strongly challenges the current alternative practices in hospital
settings. He focuses on the use of hospital ethics committees to make
life-and-death treatment decisions for infants with disabilities under a
Best Interests Standard, and concludes that the ethics committee
process is not consistent with fundamental fairness.
42
Balch surveys the history of institutional ethics committees for
resolving disputes involving life-and-death health care decisions. He
argues that their original advisory function has evolved into a
decision-making function for families and patients, and that these
committees wield enormous power yet are largely insulated from
liability for their decisions due to state immunity statutes. Because
the lives of disabled infants are at stake, and because life is a
constitutionally protected right,43 Balch subjects the ethics committee
process to a procedural due process analysis, and finds it lacking in
basic procedural protections.
He argues that the Best Interests Standard typically applied by
ethics committees in clinical settings is unconstitutionally vague, thus
providing inadequate notice of the committee's reasons for its
contemplated action. Analogizing the Best Interests Standard to
statutory prohibitions against engaging in conduct that "annoys" a
police officer or against "contemptuously" treating the U.S. flag,
which have been ruled unconstitutionally vague, Balch argues that
the Best Interests Standard likewise fails to advise surrogates for
infants with disabilities what evidence they must marshal in order to
prevent a denial of life-saving treatment for their infant.
44
Observing that due process requires neutrality or independence of
the decision maker, Balch also challenges whether an ethics
committee can be a neutral decision maker, for most committee
42. Thomas J. Balch, Are There Checks and Balances on Terminating the Lives of Children with
Disabilities? Should There Be?, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009).
43. Balch acknowledges that state action is required for application of 14th amendment due process
protections, and that such state action is not present when ethics committees at private (rather than
government) hospitals resolve cases involving infants with disabilities. He nevertheless adopts the due
process paradigm for such cases because it embodies the tenets of fundamental fairness and thus serves
as a template to evaluate the fairness and propriety of ethics committee procedures. Id. at 963.
44. Id. at 976.
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members are affiliated with the hospital staff. Urging that due process
requires that surrogates have a right to counsel at an ethics committee
hearing where denial of life-saving treatment is contemplated, he
argues for other procedural safeguards akin to those in administrative
hearings in contested cases. Though he would doubtless prefer more
widespread implementation of the Baby Doe Rules over the current
alternative practices in most hospital settings, Balch acknowledges
current clinical reality and subjects it to stringent due process
analysis, concluding that it does not comport with fundamental
fairness.
Robert D. Truog, Professor of Medical Ethics, Anaesthesiology,
and Pediatrics at Harvard Medical School, begins his essay with the
controversial Texas case of Sun Hudson, a baby who suffered from a
lethal form of dwarfism and from whom doctors unilaterally
withdrew life support over the objection of his mother but in
accordance with the Texas Advance Directives Act.45 Taking this
case as his starting point, Truog provides a thoughtful reflection on
the meaning of medical futility, when health care professionals
consider continued aggressive treatment medically inappropriate (like
Sun Hudson's case). He also carefully evaluates two procedural
approaches that have been adopted to resolve disputes over futile
care: the Texas statute and the hospital policy at Children's Hospital
Boston.
Truog undertakes a "differential diagnosis" of the concept of
futility, building on the concepts of power, trust, hope, money, and
suffering. With respect to power, he observes that during the past few
decades, the ethical questions have shifted from patients' rights to
refuse treatment (now largely recognized) to patients' or surrogates'
rights to demand treatment (over which there is little consensus).
Skepticism or lack of trust among patients and families resisting
physicians' attempts to deny treatment perceived to be possibly
beneficial should not be surprising, says Truog, because most futility
cases to date have involved disadvantaged groups who have been
45. Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 985 (2009).
[Vol. 25:4
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previously denied access to health care in other contexts. Hope
against all odds is just human nature (look at the success of lotteries),
according to Truog, and has a place in the compassionate care of
patients.
Truog observes that while money should in theory play no role in
futility decisions (if a treatment is futile, it's not worth doing no
matter how much or how little the cost), in fact futility concerns have
been intertwined with issues of saving money and cutting costs. He
argues that targeting vulnerable cases like Sun Hudson for tacit
allocation of resources in the name futility while ignoring other
expensive and useless drug treatments for paying patients is both
unfair and ineffective. Evidence-based research suggests that
eliminating all so-called futile care would produce relatively little
cost-savings.46 As for suffering, Truog believes more serious
attention should be given to the suffering of everyone involved-
patients, families, and caregivers.Y
Truog compares the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA),
which he regards as seriously flawed and stacking the deck in favor
of physicians over patients so as to give physicians virtually absolute
decision-making authority,48 with the futility policy at Children's
Hospital Boston, which he helped to develop a decade ago. He
stresses that the process for resolving futility disputes is central to
evaluating the legitimacy of their outcomes, and raises due process
objections to the Texas statutory procedure, similar to those that
Balch raises in the context of hospital ethics committees, including
lack of neutrality in the decision makers who nonetheless wield
significant power.49 Truog also criticizes the lack of court oversight
under TADA for the decisions of hospital ethics committees to
unilaterally terminate treatment over family objection, with judicial
review limited to extending the waiting period before termination. By
contrast, says Truog, the policy at Children's Hospital Boston has
46. Id. at 993.
47. Id. at 996.
48. Id. at 988.
49. Id. at 999.
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never been implemented unilaterally to terminate treatment, probably
due to the greater options that the policy provides to families as well
as to the intensive efforts undertaken to reach mutual resolution.5 °
Thomas Win. Mayo, who is the director of the Cary M.
Maguire Center for Ethics and Public Responsibility and Associate
Professor at SMU's Dedman School of Law, has first-hand
experience with the Texas Advance Directive Act, as he has been a
member of the advisory panel to the Texas legislature on this law
since 1998. Mayo emphasizes that nothing in the TADA changes the
impact of the Baby Doe rules on clinical practice in Texas. After the
TADA's 2003 amendment to encompass medical decision-making
for minors, the state's Child Protective Services officials still retain
authority to intervene in any case where they believe that medically
indicated treatment is being withheld from a disabled infant with a
life-threatening condition.
5 1
Mayo considers objections that have been raised against the
TADA, including those raised by Truog. Like the concerns reflected
in the essays by Balch and Truog, the principal criticism has been
that there are insufficient procedural protections for patients and
surrogates under the Act against biased, flawed, or inappropriate
decisions by treating physicians.52 Defending the Act, Mayo
discusses the advantages of utilizing the in-house ethics committee
approach over resort to the courts, particularly with respect to
professional expertise in medical decision-making.
Mayo also argues that the Act's critics have fundamentally
misinterpreted the Act as precluding judicial review of the underlying
merits of a case that could be brought under the TADA.
5
Acknowledging that there is nothing in the Act that explicitly
provides for judicial review of the substantive treatment decision,
Mayo observes that there was widespread agreement among the
advisory panel's early discussions that such judicial review would be
available under usual procedures for declaratory and injunctive relief.
According to Mayo, spelling out these procedures in the TADA
50. Id.
51. Thomas W. Mayo, The Baby Doe Rule and Texas's "Futility Law'" in the NICU, 25 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1003, 1007 (2009).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1010.
[Vol. 25:4
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would have been unnecessarily redundant, and nothing in TADA
precludes substantive judicial review of disputes over medical
decision-making.
5 4
Mayo proposes several amendments to address critics'
concerns and clarify the scope of the Act.55 He recommends making
the availability of substantive judicial review more explicit in the
Act. He also suggests limiting civil immunity from liability to
monetary damages, but allowing injunctive relief. In addition, he
observes that disputes over the care of competent patients who have
decision-making capacity should not come within the Act's scope. To
address discrimination concerns raised by disability advocacy groups
over the Act's applicability to patients with irreversible conditions,
Mayo recommends limiting its scope to patients with terminal
conditions. He also proposes extending the Act's time deadlines to
allow the families of patients more opportunity to prepare for review
or to find an alternative willing provider, and he suggests that there
be additional opportunities to utilize informal dispute-resolution
mechanisms before and during the review process.
Ellen Waldman, Professor of Law and Director of the Mediation
Program at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, is concerned that there
may be too much focus these days on "good process," reflecting
unrealistic hopes that procedural tools such as mediation can resolve
disputes over futility and the treatment of marginally viable lives.
5 6
Waldman takes as her starting point that, to date, there is no societal
consensus on the meaning of futility in medical contexts, and that
because the only emerging consensus is that no consensus is possible
over substantive standards for defining when care is futile, the focus
has shifted to the process for resolving futility disputes. Waldman
observes that mediation's procedural power normally occurs against a
backdrop of legal and ethical norms. However, because there are no
substantive norms that clearly delineate the respective rights of the
parties disputing over whether aggressive care is legally or ethically
54. Id. at 1010-13.
55. Id. at 1013.
56. Ellen Waldman, The Baby Doe Regulations and Tragic Choices at the Bedside: Accepting the
Limits of Good Process, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1019 (2009).
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required in extreme (arguably futile) cases, Waldman contends that
reliance on process to resolve these disputes is likely to fail in many
cases.
Waldman provides a clear roadmap for understanding why
mediation does not work as well in these cases as it can in other
settings. To begin with, futile care disputes often reflect radically
different values among families and caregivers over whether
marginally viable life is worth preserving, let alone whether it is
worth the costs of preserving it. Attempting to negotiate over such
core human, religious, personal, or professional values is not likely to
produce much constructive or conciliatory movement on either side.58
Mediation is a process of managing information, emotion, and
expectations, according to Waldman. Mediation can be useful when
the source of the conflict is lack of information or lack of good
communication, which can result in misunderstandings. In this
circumstance, a mediator can helpfully broaden the parties'
information base and understanding of each side's needs and
perspectives and thus help the parties resolve their conflict. In cases
involving futility disputes, however, families may simply reject the
medical information provided, or even if they accept it, disagree over
its implications for treatment.59 In addition, the intense and complex
set of emotions among families whose loved one's very existence is
at stake can significantly compromise the chances of rational
resolution.
Waldman argues, moreover, that contemporary reliance on "good
process" is likely to empower families (who have nothing to lose by
continuing a procedural contest) and to prompt providers (who are
averse both to risks and to litigation) to capitulate to family demands
for continued aggressive care. Acknowledging that emboldening
families and cowing clinicians60 may be the substantive outcome that
society wants, Waldman nonetheless challenges us to consider,
57. Id. at 1023-24.
58. Id. at 1034.
59. Id. at 1031-32.
60. Id. at 1038.
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openly and transparently, whether this is so, rather than try to mask
this substantive outcome behind a veneer of "good process." Thus,
our current focus on process leads us inexorably back to substance,
and Waldman encourages renewed societal efforts toward crafting an
acceptable definition of futility and acceptable limits of medical
treatment. The process we should be focused on, says Waldman, is on
gaining societal consensus on the norms or standards for making
difficult decisions over when enough treatment is enough.61
THE INFLUENCE OF DISABILITY LAW AND
POLICY ON THE BABY DOE RULES
Mary Crossley, Dean and Professor of Law at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law, reflects on how disability law and policy
may be implicated in medical treatment decisions for newborns.62
She makes a crucial distinction between, on one hand, a newborn like
the original Indiana Baby Doe, who had a mental disability (Down
syndrome) and an independent medical condition requiring life-
saving treatment, and on the other hand, the extremely premature
newborn whose medical needs are more complex and whose
prognosis (probability of survival with treatment and extent of future
disabilities if the child survives) are much more uncertain than Baby
Doe's was. In the former case, the treatment was known to be
effective in ameliorating Baby Doe's life-threatening condition, and
if provided the child would have survived with a known disability. In
the latter case, however, there is often great prognostic uncertainty
about the extremely premature newborn's chances of survival and the
future nature or extent of disability. Crossley's essay poses
challenging questions about how the increased complexity in the
latter cases might change the nature of parental decision-making for
these infants as well as how disability concerns are implicated in
these decisions.63
61. Id. 1039-42.
62. Mary Crossley, Rescuing Baby Doe, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1043 (2009).
63. Id. at 1046.
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Because the parents and physicians involved in the original Baby
Doe case likely would have consented to treatment had the infant not
had Down syndrome, Crossley suggests that to the extent that the
refusal of treatment in that case was influenced by societal and
medical biases about people with disabilities, it seems to reflect a
kind of discrimination that our society finds objectionable. Decision-
making for extremely premature newborns, however, for whom
everything about their future is uncertain, seems likely to be
influenced more by the expectation of, rather than the existence of, a
disability. She also suggests that insistence on aggressive treatment to
provide any chance, however remote, that a marginally viable
newborn might survive may reflect a perspective concerned more
with vitalism than with disability rights.
64
Crossley examines the Baby Doe Rules in their present context-
as a species of child welfare law rather than discrimination law-and
considers how such law governs parental decision-making about
medical treatment for children. As applied to the special parent-child
relationship, tort law's "duty to rescue" requires parents to undertake
reasonable steps to rescue their children from harm, but does not
require them to place themselves or their other children in peril to
save a child. Because of strong constitutional protections for parental
autonomy and the rights of parents to make a range of decisions
affecting the welfare of their children, courts have overridden
parental decisions only when necessary to protect their child from
significant harm, and have not required medical treatment for all
potentially life-threatening conditions in older children, particularly
when the proposed treatment's benefits are not clear.65 Crossley
acknowledges that the Baby Doe Rules' narrow exceptions for non-
treatment serve the laudable goal of limiting death-dealing decisions
based on bias against disabled lives, but she suggests that the Rules
are nonetheless in tension with other socially valuable goals like
protecting parental autonomy in uncertain and complex cases.66 She
64. Id. at 1048.
65. Id. 1053-54.
66. Id. at 1055.
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advances the case for support from disability advocates for the fully
educated and informed, yet limited, exercise of parental discretion in
these difficult cases involving marginally viable newborns.
Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis, Professors of
Philosophy and Chairs of the Philosophy Departments at San
Francisco State University and the University of Utah, respectively,
draw a similar distinction between the kinds of newborns that
prompted the first set of Baby Doe Rules (like Baby Doe with Down
syndrome, who was denied surgery that in all likelihood would have
been provided to a baby who did not have a similar mental disability)
and the kinds of newborns that present some of the most difficult
treatment questions today (infants born extremely prematurely or at
very low birthweights whose prognosis for survival is uncertain, and
whose diagnosed medical conditions may or may not lead to
disabilities).67 Under the current Baby Doe Rules, they argue, the
regulatory scheme provides special treatment for disabled infants that
older disabled children or children without disabilities may not be
provided, rather than providing disabled infants protection against
discriminatory denial of equal services that non-disabled infants
would be given, which anti-discrimination rationale was the focus of
the first set of the Baby Doe Rules.
68
Silvers and Francis carefully trace the history of the two sets of
Baby Doe Rules. The initial federal policy response to denials of life-
saving treatment for newborns with congenital anomalies resulting in
mental disability was to invoke Section 504 of the federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Secretary of Health and Human
Services promulgated the first set of Baby Doe regulations under this
Act, interpreting the Act to allow federal intervention to prohibit
hospitals from withholding medically indicated treatment from a
handicapped child solely on the basis of handicap. These regulations
67. Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis, Playing God with Baby Doe: Quality of Life and
Unpredictable Standards at Start of Life, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1061, 1072 (2009). Professor Silvers
spoke at the symposium. Professor Francis is also a Professor of Law.
68. Id. at 1180 ("Rather than authorizing claims against inequality of medical treatment based on
disability, and specifically against the withholding of necessary treatment based on disability, CAPTA
assigns an entitlement to medical treatment based on disability.").
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were ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court for several reasons,
among them that there had been no showing that hospitals were in
fact withholding treatment from disabled infants on the basis of
disability; rather, they had not treated the infants because they lacked
parental consent to do so, and parents are not subject to the federal
Act.
69
The authors discuss the shift in focus from disability
discrimination in the first set of Baby Doe Rules to child abuse and
neglect in the second and current set of rules, which were
promulgated by Congress as amendments to the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act.70 They argue that the original anti-
discrimination impetus to protect disabled newborns from
discrimination was replaced with another, categorical directive to
save newborn lives, however low were the chances that aggressive
treatment might save them: "language of CAPTA has shifted
attention from the comparative right to equality of meaningful access
to medical treatment to the categorical right to life."'71 The current
rules thus suggest more aggressive grounds for federal intervention
than was the case under the Section 504 regulations, and they could
require life-saving treatment for a disabled infant despite a small
likelihood of effectiveness, which might not be required for a non-
disabled infant for whom medical decision-making is judged under a
different standard.
72
Silvers and Francis urge that the Baby Doe Rules be revisited in
light of the original focus of regulation in this area-the prevention
of disability discrimination-because disability biases still operate in
our society, which may be obscured by prognostic uncertainty for
extremely premature infants, and which may be masked by vague yet
alarming predictions and exaggerated claims about the potential
burdens posed by disabled children. These authors conclude that the
69. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Assoc., 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
70. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i (2006) and implemented in relevant part by 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008)).
71. See Silvers & Francis, supra note 67 at 1093.
72. Id. at 1079.
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Rules should be clarified to demonstrate an entitlement of disabled
infants, not to a right to life nor to special treatment, but rather to
procedural equality in deciding what treatment they should be
provided.73 They encourage the development of procedural guidelines
that incorporate the "ethics of incertitude" in medical prognosis, and
that would help in avoiding disability discrimination when dealing
with uncertainty about an infant's prospects for disability.74
CONCLUSION
As symposium preparations were underway in the Fall of 2008,
The New York Times reported global statistics that ranked the United
States as 29th in the world for infant mortality as of 2004 (tied with
Poland and Slovakia), down from 12th in the world in 1960.75 Two-
thirds of the annual 28,000 infant deaths in the United States are in
pre-term babies, and the rate of premature births is increasing.
Clearly, the serious challenges in providing appropriate health care to
sick and premature newborns have not diminished since the Baby
Doe Rules were enacted twenty-five years ago.
And yet as a society we have not reached consensus over what
substantive standards we should use to make treatment decisions for
highly at-risk infants. The opening symposium speaker, Mark
Mercurio, observes that "the line has moved, but the fundamental
issue is the same," and that whether aggressive treatment should be
optional or even offered in some cases depends upon the extent of an
infant's potential neurological disabilities and concerns about his
quality-of-life, and that physicians, ethicists, and lawyers continue to
disagree over the relevance of these and other concerns. 76
The Baby Doe Rules offer one set of standards for making these
treatment decisions, which many interpret as reflecting a "do
73. Id. at 1063-1064.
74. Id. at 1094.
75. Gardiner Harris, "Infant Deaths Drop in U.S., but Rate Is Still High," The New York Times (Oct.
16,2008).
76. Mercurio, supra note 14, at 855.
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everything" approach if there is any chance of saving an infant's life
in the present, without reference to possible quality-of-life concerns
in the future. Are these the right standards? Responses vary, and the
Rules continue to spark criticism. Bhatia argues that quality-of-life
should play a role in the care of newborns, particularly with respect
to palliative care. Kopelman forthrightly argues that the Rules set the
wrong standards, and that treatment decisions for newborns should be
made under the same standards used for older children and
incapacitated adults-namely, the Best Interests Standard, which
allows individualized decision-making in light of the net benefits and
burdens that treatment poses for an infant. Winslade suggests that the
vitalism principle reflected in the Rules is a permissible, but not
obligatory, ethical basis for continuing aggressive treatment despite
disagreements among health care providers. Silvers and Francis argue
that guarding against disability biases should be a substantive factor
in decision-making, but acknowledge that anti-discrimination
principles are not the focus of the current Baby Doe Rules. Crossely
offers that principles of child welfare law should inform decision-
making in the care of very sick infants. And Sayeed argues that
whatever the right standards or factors in decision-making may be,
physicians should be more transparent about how they are applying
them in actual clinical practice.
With so many diverse and well-reasoned views on the normative
standards for decision-making in the newborn nursery, it is little
wonder that there has been a shift in the contours of the debate from
the substantive norms to the processes by which these decisions are
handled. Balch criticizes current practices among hospital ethics
committees, which he argues fail to provide adequate due process
protections and fundamental fairness in deliberations over infant
treatment. Truog levels similar criticisms at the statutory process
enacted in Texas that allows unilateral termination of treatment over
a surrogate's objection, but he also believes that hospital futility
policies can provide a good basis for collaborative and consensus-
oriented decision-making. Waldman cautions that even if the
processes for decision-making are legally and ethically appropriate,
[Vol. 25:4
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many of these highly-charged decisions about infants at the edge of
meaningful existence will simply not be amenable to collaborative
resolution in practice, no matter how good the process may be in
theory.
Thus, after twenty-five years, the Baby Doe Rules have not
resolved how decisions about appropriate treatment for seriously ill
and extremely premature infants should be made, nor have they
forged a societal consensus over the standards for decision-making.
While the Rules may not be openly used to guide decision-making in
much of clinical practice today, they continue to reflect the
underlying ethical and societal tensions that prompted their
enactment in the first place and that still need to be resolved.
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APPENDIX A
BABY DOE RULES
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (PL 98-457), updated at 42
U.S.C. § 5106
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA)
Overview: 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2006) authorizes the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services to make grants to
states to improve their child protective services systems. To be
eligible for such a grant, a state must provide a number of assurances,
including the guarantee that it will address medical neglect.
Specifically, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B) (2006), the state
shall provide:
(B) an assurance that the State has in place procedures for
responding to the reporting of medical neglect (including
instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions), procedures or
programs, or both (within the State child protective services
system), to provide for--
(i) coordination and consultation with individuals
designated by and within appropriate health-care
facilities;
(ii) prompt notification by individuals designated by and
within appropriate health-care facilities of cases of
suspected medical neglect (including instances of
withholding of medically indicated treatment from
disabled infants with life-threatening conditions); and
(iii) authority, under State law, for the State child
protective services system to pursue any legal remedies,
including the authority to initiate legal proceedings in a
court of competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to
[VoL 25:4
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prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life threatening conditions...
Definition: 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(6) (2006) provides:
(6) the term "withholding of medically indicated treatment"
means the failure to respond to the infant's life-threatening
conditions by providing treatment (including appropriate
nutrition, hydration, and medication) which, in the treating
physician's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment, will be
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such
conditions, except that the term does not include the failure to
provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or
medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or
physicians' reasonable medical judgment --
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would--
(i) merely prolong dying;
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of
the infant's life-threatening conditions; or
(Mi) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the
infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under
such circumstances would be inhumane.
20091
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APPENDIX B
THE HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO OF SOPHIE: EXTREME PREMATURITY
Initial facts: Ms. Anna Ariel is a pregnant 37-year-old woman
who has had good prenatal care. She is in premature labor at 23 and
1/7 weeks gestation by 1st trimester ultrasound examination. She is
carrying a singleton female fetus. She and her husband are well
educated, have demanding professional jobs, and have purposely
delayed becoming parents for the sake of their careers. They now
strongly desire this pregnancy and are prepared to "do whatever it
takes" to try and preserve the life of the fetus. Thus, they ask that
whatever active measures that might improve the odds of long-term
survival be taken immediately.
1st question: Is there an obligation to provide antenatal
steroids, which might accelerate fetal lung maturity and might
increase the chances of neonatal survival? Is there an obligation
to provide a c-section delivery if requested, if the fetus appears
malpositioned for vaginal delivery or if the fetus demonstrates an
intolerance to labor?
Case progression: Attempts at tocolysis (forestalling labor
progression through medical management with medications and
bedrest) fail after 24 hours. Steroids have been given once. A c-
section is performed and a female neonate is born weighing 475
grams (full-term birthweight is typically 3 kilograms). After the
umbilical cord is separated, the infant cries faintly, and her pulse is
around 100 beats per minute as she rests under warm lights (typical
newborn pulse rate is over 120 beats per minute). The parents name
the baby Sophie.
2nd question: Assuming the parents desire "everything to be
done' is there an obligation to provide a full resuscitation? If
yes, is the obligation based on the law? If so, which one(s)?
(Vol. 25:4
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Case Progression: Sophie is intubated (placed on a ventilator to
help her breathe) and stabilized and brought to the neonatal intensive
care unit (NICU) for further care. Her first 24 hours are fairly stable,
and she is on modest mechanical ventilator settings and minimal
blood pressure medication for cardiac support. The next day, Sophie
is clinically less responsive and has a fall in hematocrit (red blood
cell count), which may be indirect evidence of internal bleeding. The
attending physician obtains a head ultrasound around 48 hours after
birth, and notices an extensive hemorrhage involving one ventricle
and one side of the brain matter (comparable to grade 4 IVH). This is
generally thought to be a serious bleed into the brain which can result
in significant maldevelopment of the brain as the baby grows. When
extensive, this kind of brain injury early in life correlates with later
physical and mental handicap in older children. Sophie has not
required any increase in support but needs a blood transfusion to
improve oxygen-carrying capacity. The doctor discusses the findings
with the parents and the prognostic implications if Sophie survives to
discharge, and recommends withdrawing support, citing the best
interests of the newborn. The parents are upset and sad, but need time
to process. A little after 96 hours after birth, they agree. In the
doctor's experience, babies like this one who have been cared for in
this NICU, now have a better than 50% chance of survival to
discharge if intensive care is maximally provided going forward.
3 rd question: Does the collective decision by parents and
providers violate state laws that reflect the federal Baby Doe
standards established by the CAPTA amendments in 1984? If
so, does anyone in the hospital have an obligation to contact the
local child protective services agency?
Alternate case progression: Same facts as just before, but the
parents request the physician to continue to provide maximal support.
The physician complies, and Sophie is eventually extubated to CPAP
(which is a less invasive mode of respiratory support that supplies
distending air pressure to the upper and lower airway through prongs
20091
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that sit in the baby's nose) and at 6 weeks of life is advancing slowly
on about half-volume milk feeds through a temporary feeding tube.
Her neurological injury is fairly stable. There is a small area of cyst
formation in the brain matter where the initial injury occurred, but
she has not developed post-hemorrhagic hydrocephalus, which
involves dilation of fluid spaces inside the brain that can lead to
compression of the grey and white matter and maldevelopment of a
growing brain. Sophie has not yet had her first eye exam. Her eyes
are at risk of an eye disease called retinopathy of prematurity, which
can lead to blindness but in most cases leads to a need for corrective
prescription lenses. (Babies need several eye exams in the first few
months of life to follow the development of the retinas.)
The next day, Sophie develops bloody stool, distends her abdomen,
and the clinical picture is consistent with necrotizing enterocolitis
(NEC), which is an inflammatory process of the intestines thought to
be due to a combination of reduced blood flow to the gut and
bacterial overgrowth/infection in an injured area of bowel. The
physician discusses the implications of this with the parents, noting
that mortality with this condition at this hospital is around 20% even
after surgical intervention. Sophie appears to need re-intubation at
this time due to the severity of her illness.
4 th question: May the doctor revisit withdrawal of care with the
family and offer comfort care? Are there any legal obstacles?
Case Drogression: The parents desire to proceed with all available
cares. Sophie manages to survive the episode of NEC and has 15 cm
of small bowel resected, which is enough to potentially affect the
complete absorption of nutrients after feeding, but many babies with
this amount of bowel left are eventually able to adapt and are able to
grow exclusively on full milk/formula feeds. She is now 4 months
old, but unfortunately has been unable to wean from the ventilator
since the NEC episode. It now appears she has upper airway
compromise from prolonged intubation on top of severe chronic lung
disease. In the doctor's experience, most babies who have this degree
[Vol 25:4
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of compromise eventually need a tracheostomy (a surgically placed
hole in the neck which allows for air to enter the lungs bypassing the
mouth and upper airway) to successfully transition to a rehabilitation
facility. Sophie is no longer acutely sick, but has multiple chronic
medical problems including, poor nutrition, retinopathy of
prematurity, periventricular cystic leukomalacia (which means she is
likely to have some degree of physical handicap as she develops her
motor functions), and chronic lung disease. Her parents are now
feeling the weight of the world on their shoulders after 4 months in
the NICU and believe it would be in their daughter's best interests to
not have a tracheostomy. They request that the physician extubate her
to CPAP and make her as comfortable as possible. They specifically
do not want her reintubated. In this hospital's experience, if a
tracheostomy is provided, Sophie has a greater than 90% chance of
eventually being able to be discharged to a rehabilitation facility. Her
long-term outcome is worrisome, but she may eventually be able to
walk with assistance, breathe without the need for a ventilator or
oxygen, receive a special education into high school, and have her
vision somewhat corrected with surgery/prescription eyeglasses. In
other words, the physician now believes she is likely to survive with
significant impairments if she is given a tracheostomy.
5 th question: May the physician legally redirect to comfort care
alone now?
20091
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